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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This appeal presents an issue of first impression in our 
Court: can a post-petition payment to a creditor pursuant to a 
Wage Order entered at a debtor’s request reduce the creditor’s 
new value defense—and thereby increase preference 
liability—the same as it would if the payment had been made 
pre-petition?  
 
 Under the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee may avoid 
certain preferential transfers made by a debtor to a creditor in 
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the 90 days before its bankruptcy petition was filed. See 11 
U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006). A creditor who gives the debtor new 
value subsequent to a preference payment, however, may use 
what is referred to as the “new value” defense to offset an 
otherwise avoidable preference. See id. § 547(c)(4). The new 
value defense is not applicable to the extent that, thereafter, 
the debtor makes “an otherwise unavoidable transfer” to the 
creditor on account of the value received. Id. § 547(c)(4)(b). 
We hold that where “an otherwise unavoidable transfer” is 
made after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, it does not 
affect the new value defense. For this reason, we will affirm 
the order of the District Court affirming the Bankruptcy 




 The facts giving rise to this appeal are undisputed. 
Friedman’s, Inc. (“the Debtor”) filed for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 22, 2008, and 
thereafter the case was converted to one under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. In the 90 days prior to filing for 
bankruptcy (“the preference period”), the Debtor made 
payments for personnel to Roth Staffing (“Appellee”) totaling 
$81,997.57. After these preferential transfers, but before the 
petition was filed, Roth Staffing provided services valued at 
$100,660.88 to the Debtor. The money owed for these 
services remained unpaid as of the date the bankruptcy 
petition was filed.  
 
 On January 25, 2008, the Debtor filed a motion in 
Bankruptcy Court seeking authority to pay its employees and 
independent contractors (collectively, “Employees”), pre-
petition wages, compensation, and related benefits. It stated 
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that as of the petition date, it had approximately 3,500 
Employees and outstanding obligations to them in the amount 
of approximately $4 million. The Debtor represented to the 
Court, inter alia, that if its Employees were not compensated 
at least in part for the services that had been provided, there 
would likely be “an epidemic of Employee departures” and/or 
a “deterioration in morale.” Mot. of Debtors and Debtors in 
Possession for an Order Authorizing the Debtors To Pay 
Prepetition Wages, Compensation, and Employee Benefits 
Pursuant to Sections 105(a) and 363(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code ¶¶ 39-40, In re: Friedman’s Inc., No. 08-10161 (Bankr. 
D. Del. Jan. 25, 2008). It argued that this would “substantially 
and adversely impact [its] businesses and result in immediate 
and irreparable harm to the creditors and estates.” Id. ¶ 40.  
 
 The Debtor asked the Court to invoke its power under 
§ 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to enable the Trustee to 
make the payments to Employees pursuant to § 363(b)(1). 
Section 105(a) states, in relevant part: “The court may issue 
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 105(a). Section 363(b)(1) provides that a “trustee, after 
notice and a hearing, may use, sell or lease, other than in the 
ordinary course of business, property of the estate.” Id. § 
363(b)(1).  
 
 The Court granted the Debtor’s motion (“the Wage 
Order”). Pursuant to the Wage Order, and after filing its 
bankruptcy petition, the Debtor paid $72,412.71 to Roth 
Staffing on account of pre-petition staffing services. 
 
 On March 5, 2009, Friedman’s Liquidating Trust 
(“FLT” or “Appellant”), the successor in interest to the 
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Debtor, commenced this action in Bankruptcy Court, seeking 
to avoid and recover transfers made to Roth Staffing as 
preferences, pursuant to  § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
This section states: 
 
Except as provided in subsections (c) and (i) of 
this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer 
of an interest of the debtor in property—  
 
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;  
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by 
the debtor before such transfer was made;  
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;  
(4) made—  
(A) on or within 90 days before the date 
of the filing of the petition; or  
(B) between ninety days and one year 
before the date of the filing of the 
petition, if such creditor at the time 
of such transfer was an insider; and  
 
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than 
such creditor would receive if—  
 
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 
of this title;  
(B) the transfer had not been made; and  
(C) such creditor received payment of 
such debt to the extent provided by 
the provisions of this title.  
 




 In its answer to FLT’s complaint, Roth Staffing 
asserted the affirmative defense of new value, pursuant to § 
547(c)(4) of the Code, which reads: 
 
The trustee may not avoid under this section a 
transfer— 
 
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the 
extent that, after such transfer, such creditor 
gave new value to or for the benefit of the 
debtor—  
 
(A) not secured by an otherwise 
unavoidable security interest; and  
(B) on account of which new value the 
debtor did not make an otherwise 
unavoidable transfer to or for the 
benefit of such creditor. . .  
 
Id. § 547(c)(4). Roth Staffing claimed that because it had 
provided subsequent new value to the Debtor in an amount 
($100,660.88) exceeding the preferential transfers made 
($81,997.57), FLT could not avoid these transfers.  
 
 FLT responded by arguing that Roth Staffing’s new 
value defense had to be reduced by the post-petition payment 
of $72,412.71 that the Debtor had made pursuant to the Wage 
Order. FLT argued that this “otherwise unavoidable transfer” 
reduced Roth Staffing’s new value defense to $28,248.17, and 
therefore entitled FLT to recover $53,749.40 ($81,997.57 - 




  The Bankruptcy Court held that because FLT’s 
payments made pursuant to the Wage Order occurred after the 
bankruptcy petition was filed, these payments could not enter 
into the preference calculation. Because the Bankruptcy Code 
does not set forth a cutoff for when an “otherwise 
unavoidable transfer” should be considered in computing 
“new value,” the Court looked to caselaw. The Court 
concluded that the cutoff should be the petition date, relying 
on language from our opinion in In re New York City Shoes, 
Inc., describing the three requirements for establishing a new 
value defense as follows:  
 
First, the creditor must have received a transfer 
that is otherwise voidable as a preference under 
§ 547(b). Second, after receiving the 
preferential transfer, the preferred creditor must 
advance “new value” to the debtor on an 
unsecured basis. Third, the debtor must not 
have fully compensated the creditor for the 
“new value” as of the date that it filed its 
bankruptcy petition. 
 
880 F.2d 679, 680 (3d Cir. 1989) [hereinafter New York City 
Shoes] (emphasis added). The Bankruptcy Court found our 
opinion in New York City Shoes to be controlling, and, 
therefore, held that since the otherwise unavoidable transfer 
was made after the petition date, FLT was not entitled to 
recover on its preference claim. The District Court affirmed 
the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying summary judgment for 
FLT, but stated that it found our language in New York City 
Shoes regarding the bankruptcy petition date to be dicta. 
Nevertheless, the District Court explained that it would 
follow New York City Shoes because we described the new 
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value defense test outlined in that case as a holding in a 
subsequent opinion, In re Winstar Communications, Inc., 554 
F.3d 382, 402 (3d Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Winstar 
Communications] (“This court has held that § 547(c)(4) 
imposes three requirements . . . (3) ‘the debtor must not have 
fully compensated the creditor for the ‘new value’ as of the 
date that it filed its bankruptcy petition.’”) (emphasis added). 
The Court reasoned that while the language from Winstar 
Communications could also be construed to be dicta, it was 
reluctant to find that what we said twice, and once referred to 
as a “holding,” was dicta.   
 
 FLT now appeals the District Court’s decision. It 
argues that the Bankruptcy Court (and by extension, the 
District Court) erred in: (1) relying on dicta from New York 
City Shoes rather than the “plain language” of § 547(c)(4) of 
the Bankruptcy Code; (2) allowing Roth Staffing to “double 
dip”—contrary to policies underlying bankruptcy law—by 
asserting a new value defense even though it did not replenish 
the Debtor’s estate; and (3) failing to follow our holding in In 
re Kiwi International Air, Inc., 344 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2003) 
[hereinafter Kiwi Air], which, it urges, requires us to account 
for material events occurring after the commencement of a 
bankruptcy case in performing the preference analysis.  
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
 Our standard of review of a District Court’s review of 
a Bankruptcy Court’s decision is plenary. Winstar Commc’ns, 
554 F.3d at 389 n.3. We “exercise the same standard of 
review as the District Court in reviewing the Bankruptcy 
Court’s determinations.” Id. We review the Bankruptcy 
Court’s “legal determinations de novo, its factual findings for 
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clear error, and its exercises of discretion for abuse thereof.” 
In re Goody’s Family Clothing, Inc., 610 F.3d 812, 816 (3d 




 As a threshold matter, we must determine whether we 
are bound by prior Third Circuit precedent on the question 
presented here. If a determination by our Court is not 
necessary to our ultimate holding, “it properly is classified as 
dictum.” Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 216 F.3d 
338, 343 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000). It is well established that “we are 
not bound by our Court’s prior dicta.” Galli v. New Jersey 
Meadowlands Comm'n, 490 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2007). 
The District Court correctly noted that on both occasions 
when we previously addressed this question, our statement of 
the law may well have been dicta, and not a holding, because 
neither New York City Shoes nor Winstar Communications 
involved a post-petition payment on new value. Therefore 
neither we, nor the Bankruptcy Court nor District Court, 
would be bound by these opinions. We examine these 
opinions more closely below.  
 
A.  New York City Shoes and Winstar Communications 
 
 In New York City Shoes, we were faced with the 
question of “when a postdated check given by a debtor to a 
creditor should be deemed transferred for purposes of section 
547(c)(4).” 880 F.2d at 679. The answer to this question bore 
on whether new value had been given before or after a 
preferential transfer, and therefore whether the new value 
defense was applicable. None of the relevant transactions or 
dates in the case occurred post-petition. Therefore, when we 
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announced the test for a defense under           § 547(c)(4), and 
stated that the third requirement was that “the debtor must not 
have fully compensated the creditor for the ‘new value’ as of 
the date that it filed its bankruptcy petition,” id. at 680, the 
extra-statutory language we included regarding the petition 
date was not germane to our analysis. This language was 
dicta, and consequently not binding upon future courts.  
 
 Nevertheless, in Winstar Communications, we referred 
to the three-part test announced in New York City Shoes as a 
holding. 554 F.3d at 402. Reference to the third requirement 
was again, however, immaterial to our disposition of the case. 
In Winstar Communications, the primary questions with 
respect to the new value defense were whether new value had 
been extended after the preferential transfer, and whether new 
value had been extended on an unsecured basis. Id. We 
quoted New York City Shoes for the principle that new value 
must be extended after a preferential transfer on an unsecured 
basis. See id. at 402. Because none of the relevant 
transactions occurred post-petition, our statement regarding 
the petition date was not pertinent to our analysis. The 




                                              
1
  We are mindful that numerous courts have adopted 
and followed this dicta as if it were a holding. See, e.g., In re 
Braniff, Inc., 154 B.R. 773, 784 (Bankr. M.D. FL. 1993) 
(referring to dicta from New York City Shoes as majority 
rule); In re Energy Coop., Inc., 130 B.R. 781, 789 (N.D. Ill. 
1991) (citing New York City Shoes in holding that post-
petition transactions between creditor and debtor do not limit 
new value defense).    
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 Having established that no prior opinion binds us on 
the question presented, we turn to FLT’s other arguments. 
FLT contends that we need look no further than the text of the 
Bankruptcy Code in determining whether or not to consider 
post-petition payments. We agree; however, in doing so, we 
reach a different conclusion from the one Appellant urges 
regarding the plain meaning of the statute.  
 
B. The Plain Language of § 547(c)(4)(B) 
 
 When statutory “language is plain, the sole function of 
the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text 
is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” 
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 
530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000); see also Parker v. NutriSystem, Inc., 
620 F.3d 274, 277 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Where the statutory 
language is unambiguous, the court should not consider 
statutory purpose or legislative history.”). Here, § 
547(c)(4)(B) is silent as to when a payment must be made by 
a debtor to defeat a creditor’s new value defense. Must it have 
been made before the petition date? Do other provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code inform this issue? District and 
bankruptcy courts are nearly equally divided on this issue.
2
 
                                              
2
  Some of these cases involved post-petition payments 
made pursuant to a Critical Vendor Order. The Wage Order in 
the instant case was filed pursuant to §§ 105(a) and 363(b) of 
the Bankruptcy Code, provisions often invoked in Critical 
Vendor Orders. Given the similarity of the Wage Order to a 





Compare In re Phoenix Rest. Grp., Inc., 373 B.R. 541, 547 
(M.D. Tenn. 2007) (holding that post-petition payments made 
pursuant to Critical Vendor Order could not be used to offset 
pre-petition new value); In re Schabel, 338 B.R. 376, 381 
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2005) (holding that new value must remain 
unpaid at time of filing of bankruptcy petition); In re 
Thurman Constr., Inc., 189 B.R. 1004, 1014 (Bankr. M.D. Fl. 
1995) (finding that new value must remain unpaid as of 
petition date, rather than date court adjudicates preference 
action); In re Braniff, Inc., 154 B.R. 773, 784-85 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fl. 1993) (following “majority rule” articulated in New 
York City Shoes that new value remain unpaid as of petition 
date); and In re Energy Coop., Inc., 130 B.R. 781, 789 (N.D. 
Ill. 1991) (citing New York City Shoes for principle that post-
bankruptcy payments by debtor do not limit new value 
                                                                                                     
 Also analogous are cases in which post-petition 
payments were made pursuant to  § 503(b)(9), which allows 
for administrative expense priority for the value of goods 
received by a debtor 20 days before filing for bankruptcy. 
Courts are similarly divided on whether goods given priority 
later pursuant to § 503(b)(9) can constitute new value. 
Compare In re Commissary Operations, Inc., 421 B.R. 873, 
878 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010) (holding that deliveries 
entitled to a § 503(b)(9) claim are not disqualified from 
constituting new value), with In re T.I. Acquisition, LLC, 429 
B.R. 377 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010) (holding that new value 
defense does not apply where creditor has been paid for 
goods pursuant to § 503(b)(9)), and In re Circuit City Stores, 
Inc., No. 10-3068, 2010 WL 4956022 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Dec. 
1, 2010) (applying analysis from T.I. Acquisition in 
concluding that same materials cannot be the basis for both a 
new value defense and § 503(b)(9) claim).  
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defense); with In re Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc., 485 B.R. 672, 
733-34 (D.N.M. 2012) [hereinafter Furr’s Supermarkets] 
(holding that cutting off preference calculation at petition date 
“makes no economic sense”); In re Login Bros. Book Co., 
294 B.R. 297, 300 (N.D. Ill. 2003) [hereinafter Login Bros.] 
(“[B]oth the plain language and policy behind the statute 
indicate that the timing of a repayment of new value is 
irrelevant.”); In re MMR Holding Corp., 203 B.R. 605, 609 
(Bankr. M.D. La. 1996) (“An unavoidable post-petition 
transfer on account of new value extended subsequent to a 
preference should limit the use of § 547(c)(4) by the amount 
of the unavoidable transfer, as without a reduction in the new 
value offset, the transferee would be receiving double use of 
the new value. . ..”); and In re D.J. Mgmt. Grp., 161 B.R. 5, 8 
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that post-petition payments 
on new value must be considered under § 547(c)(4)).  
 
 The fact that courts are divided in their interpretations 
of § 547(c)(4)(B) does not mean, however, that the provision 
is necessarily ambiguous. See In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 369 
(3d Cir. 2004) (“[J]ust because a particular provision may be, 
by itself, susceptible to differing constructions does not mean 
that the provision is therefore ambiguous.”). A provision is 
ambiguous, “when, despite a studied examination of the 
statutory context, the natural reading of a provision remains 
elusive.” Id. We have previously noted that “in interpreting 
the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court has been reluctant 
to declare its provisions ambiguous, preferring instead to take 
a broader, contextual view, and urging courts to ‘not be 
guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look 
to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and 
policy.’” Id. at 369 (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 
43 (1986)). Context is therefore key in determining the 
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meaning of a particular provision and whether or not it is 
ambiguous. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of 
Cybergenics Corp., ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 
F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“As the Supreme 
Court has often noted, ‘[s]tatutory construction [ ] is a holistic 
endeavor,’ and this is especially true of the Bankruptcy 
Code.”) (quoting United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of 
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)); see 
also Alli v. Decker, 650 F.3d 1007, 1012 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(holding that courts may look to statutory context in making 
threshold ambiguity determination). If, after close 
examination of the statutory context and underlying policy 
goals, the plain meaning of a provision is still unclear, we 
then turn to pre-Code practice and legislative history to find 
meaning. See In re Price, 370 F.3d at 369. These tools of 
construction, however, are tools of last resort. Id. 
 
 Appellant argues that the statute plainly indicates that 
a debtor’s payment offsetting new value may occur at any 
time, either pre- or post-petition, as long as it is a transfer 
made after the new value is extended. Appellant bases this 
interpretation on the Code’s silence, in that it lacks any 
specific language containing a temporal limitation. Because 
the drafters could have set forth a cutoff date, but did not, 
Appellant urges there is no limit. This reading has some 
appeal, but does not take into account the context in which 
the provision is found. If we read the statute in this manner, 
the time period involved would be totally open-ended such 
that any payment, at any time, could defeat a new value 
defense. Did Congress really intend there to be no limit to 
when a payment defeating a new value defense could be 
made in determining whether a preference has occurred? We 
think not.  
16 
 
 However, we rest this conclusion primarily on the 
context and policy of the Code, rather than specific language, 
as we discuss below. We, therefore, do not rely on two 
arguments Appellee makes hinging on single words and 
phrases in § 547(c)(4). For example, Appellee contends that 
the word “transfer” as used in § 547(c)(4) refers back to § 
547(b), which states that in order for a transfer to be 
avoidable, it must have occurred within the 90 days preceding 
the petition date.
3
 Appellee urges that the later use of 
“transfer” must mean that the later word is also modified by 
the 90-day phrase. While in two instances in § 547(c)(4) 
“transfer” is clearly modified in a way referring back to the 
90-day period, in the last instance, referring to the “otherwise 
unavoidable transfer” issue here, it is not. The mere addition 
of the word “unavoidable” does not give us any reason to 
think that such a temporal limitation should apply. Thus, this 
argument is without merit. 
                                              
3
  Section § 547(b)(4) provides : 
 
[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an 
interest of the debtor in property— 
 (4) made— 
(A) on or within 90 days before 
the date of the filing of the 
petition; or  
(B) between ninety days and one 
year before the date of the 
filing of the petition, if such 
creditor at the time of such 
transfer was an insider. . .  
 
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4).  
17 
 
 Appellee rests on similarly shaky ground where it 
argues that the use of the word “debtor” rather than “estate” 
or “debtor-in-possession” might indicate that the provision 
only refers to pre-petition activity. Several other courts have 
found this argument persuasive,
4
 but it does not withstand 
scrutiny. Not only does the Bankruptcy Code fail to define a 
“debtor” as a pre-petition, as opposed to post-petition, entity, 
see 11 U.S.C. § 101(13), but also many other provisions in 
the Code refer to “debtors” in the post-petition context. See, 
e.g., id. § 329 (referring to attorneys representing “a debtor” 
in a case under the title); and § 521 (describing a debtor’s 
                                              
4
  See, e.g., In re Phoenix Rest. Grp., Inc., 317 B.R. 491, 
497 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2004) (“Throughout § 547, “the 
debtor” refers to the prepetition entity . . .. Had Congress 
intended § 547(c)(4)(B) to account for payments made post 
petition, the section would have included something like ‘an 
otherwise unavoidable transfer of an interest of the estate in 
property to or for the benefit of such creditor.’”); In re 
Sharoff Food Serv., Inc., 179 B.R. 669, 678 (Bankr. D.Co. 
1995) (citing In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 850 F.2d at 1284) 
(stating that “the specific language ‘to or for the benefit of the 
debtor’ [implies] that the subsequent advances of new value 
are only those given prepetition, because any post-petition 
advances are given to the debtor's estate, not the debtor”); In 
re D.J. Mgmt. Grp., 161 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(“The phrase ‘the debtor’ is systematically used throughout 
the Bankruptcy Code to connote an entity different from ‘the 
estate,’ ‘the Trustee,’ or ‘the debtor-in-possession.’ If 
Congress had intended to recognize a ‘new value’ exception 
for credit extended to the ‘estate’ or to the ‘trustee,’ it would 
not have used the word ‘debtor.’”). 
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post-petition duties). We must conclude that Appellee’s 
argument, therefore, is not persuasive on this issue.  
 
 Rather than focusing, as the parties do, on the presence 
or absence of individual words and phrases within § 
547(c)(4)(B), we take a broader approach to our analysis, 
examining the provision in the context of the Bankruptcy 
Code as a whole.  
 
 1.  Statutory Context 
 
 We find numerous contextual indicators in the Code 
that point to the petition date as a cutoff for analysis of the 
new value defense. First, as a general matter, § 547 is titled 
“Preferences,” and therefore suggests that it concerns 
transactions occurring during the preference period, which is 
by definition pre-petition (i.e., the 90 days before the filing of 
the petition). It would make sense that the calculation of the 
amount of the preference, and application of any new value 





                                              
5
  We also note that post-petition transactions and the 
avoidance of post-petition transfers are separately dealt with 
in § 549 of the Code. The post-petition transfer pursuant to 
the Wage Order would appear to be unavoidable as analyzed 
under § 549, as it was specifically authorized by court order. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)(2)(B). How can we then say it has the 
pernicious effect of creating, if you will, a pre-petition 
preference? Would not this at least send mixed signals that 
are ill-advised, if not illogical? 
19 
 
 Second, Appellee urges that the fact that the preference 
test known as the “hypothetical liquidation test” must be 
performed as of the petition date points to that date as the 
cutoff for determining new value. We agree. The hypothetical 
liquidation test requires courts to compare the payment 
received by a creditor during the preference period with what 
the creditor would have received if the payment had not been 
made and the debtor’s assets were liquidated and distributed 
to creditors “to the extent provided by the provisions of [the] 
title.” 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5). Courts have held that this test 
should be performed as of the petition date even though the 
statute does not specify the date to be used. See, e.g., In re 
Union Meeting Partners, 163 B.R. 229, 237 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1994) (holding that hypothetical liquidation analysis must be 
conducted as of date bankruptcy petition is filed); see also 5 
Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 547.03 (16th ed. 2013) (stating that § 
547(b)(5) codifies holding from Palmer Clay Products Co. v. 
Brown, 297 U.S. 227 (1936), in setting petition date as date to 
be used in hypothetical liquidation analysis). Extending 
preference analysis past the petition date would be 
inconsistent with § 547(b)(5).  
 
 Third, the statute of limitations for filing a preference 
avoidance action under        § 547 in a voluntary case begins 
to run on the petition date.
6
 This supports the notion that the 
                                              
6
  The statute of limitations reads: 
 
(a) An action proceeding under section . . . 547 . 
. . may not be commenced after the earlier of— 
 (1) the later of – 
(A) 2 years after the entry of 
the order for relief; or 
20 
 
cause of action accrues as of that date. See 11 U.S.C. § 546. If 
Congress had intended to allow for post-petition transactions 
to affect the impact on the estate, it is likely that it would 
have crafted a different statute of limitations. The fact that the 
statute of limitations for a preference avoidance action under 
§ 547 generally begins on the petition date suggests that the 
calculation of preference liability should remain constant 
post-petition. If we read § 547(c)(4)(B) to allow post-petition 
payments to defeat a new value defense, the calculation of 
preference liability could change depending on when the 
preference avoidance action was filed.  
 
 Fourth, Appellee argues that extending the preference 
analysis past the petition date would be inconsistent with the 
“improvement-in-position” test articulated in § 547(c)(5). 
This provision provides a defense from preference liability 
for a creditor with a floating lien on a debtor’s inventory and 
receivables, so long as the creditor did not improve its 
position during the preference period. Notably, the provision 
                                                                                                     
(B) 1 year after the 
appointment or election of 
the first trustee . . . if such 
appointment or such 
election occurs before the 
expiration of the period 
specified in subparagraph 
(A); or 
 (2) the time the case is closed or 
dismissed. 
 
11 U.S.C. § 546(a). In a voluntary case, the commencement 
of the case constitutes an “order for relief.” Id. § 301(b).  
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includes the phrase “as of the date of the filing of the 
petition.” Appellee avers that because Congress specifically 
articulated an intention—in an analogous defense to 
preference liability—to confine the analysis to pre-petition 
activity, we should assume it had the same intention with 
respect to the new value defense. The converse could be 
argued, however; namely, that this omission from § 547(c)(4) 
was intentional, since Congress knew how to set forth a 
relevant time period when it thought it applied. Still, on 
balance, we believe that the policy of improvement of 
position prior to the petition date is central to the concept of 
preference. We find this provision to bolster our reasoning 
 
Lastly, if we allow post-petition payments to affect the 
preference analysis, it would seem logical also to consider 
post-petition extensions of new value to be available as a 
defense. However, the vast majority of courts that have 
considered this issue have concluded that new value advanced 
after the petition date should not be considered in a creditor’s 
new value defense. See In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 850 
F.2d 1275, 1284-85 (8th Cir. 1988); In re Rocor Int’l, Inc., 
352 B.R. 319, 333 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2006); In re George 
Transfer, Inc., 259 B.R. 89, 96 (Bankr. D. Md. 2001); In re 
Sharoff Food Serv., Inc., 179 B.R. 669, 678 (Bankr. D. Co. 
1995); In re D.J. Mgmt. Grp., 161 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Jolly “N,” Inc., 122 B.R. 897, 909-10 
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1991); In re Vunovich, 74 B.R. 629, 632 (D. 
Kan. 1987); see also In re Kumar Bavishi & Assocs., 906 
F.2d 942, 951 n.9 (3d Cir. 1990) (Cowen, J., dissenting) 
(noting trend among courts to exclude post-petition advances 
of new value from preference analysis); 4 Norton Bankruptcy 
Law and Practice 3d § 66:36 (2013) (“[P]ostpetition 
extensions of unsecured credit to the debtor are not 
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encompassed by § 547(c)(4) and may not be utilized to 
protect prior preferential transfers.”). But see In re Keydata 
Corp., 37 B.R. 324, 329 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (approving 
without discussion setoff of post-petition service against pre-
petition preferential transfers). Although § 547(c)(4) only 
specifies that new value be given to a debtor subsequent to a 
preference payment, courts have read the petition date into 
the statute as a cutoff. At least one court has found that the 
logic leading to the conclusion that post-petition new value 
should not be considered in the preference analysis also 
applies to the issue before us. See In re Murray, Inc., No. 04-
13611, 2007 WL 5595447, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. June 6, 
2007) (“[T]he Trustee would have the Court conclude that 
post-petition payments remain in play while post-petition 
advances of new value are excluded from the analysis under § 
547(c)(4). Logically, and as a matter of statutory consistency, 
the Trustee’s argument fails.”).  
 
While, as we noted above, a number of courts have 
come out the other way on the issue before us, none has made 
a convincing contextual argument. See Furr’s Supermarkets, 
485 B.R. at 730-34 (resting primarily on policy grounds, as 
we discuss below); Login Bros., 294 B.R. at 300-301 (same); 
In re MMR Holding Corp., 203 B.R. at 609 (stating that 
“[a]voidable is avoidable,” and concluding that “[i]t simply 
does not matter that the avoidable transfer subsequent to the 
extension of new value is a pre- or post-petition avoidable 
transfer”); In re D.J. Mgmt. Grp., 161 B.R. at 8 (rejecting 
argument that just because recovery of post-petition transfer 
is time-barred under § 549 means that it cannot be considered 
in calculating amount of preference). Thus we believe that the 
context of the Code supports the conclusion that post-petition 
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payments by a debtor do not affect a creditor’s new value 
defense. 
  
 2. Policy 
 
 Appellant argues that the policies underlying the 
preference provision and the new value defense should 
compel us to conclude that post-petition payments defeat a 
new value defense. For the reasons that follow, we disagree. 
 
 The Supreme Court has articulated two policies 
underlying § 547:  
 
First, by permitting the trustee to avoid pre-
bankruptcy transfers that occur within a short 
period before bankruptcy, creditors are 
discouraged from racing to the courthouse to 
dismember the debtor during his slide into 
bankruptcy. The protection thus afforded the 
debtor often enables him to work his way out of 
a difficult financial situation through 
cooperation with all of his creditors. Second, 
and more important, the preference provisions 
facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of 
equality of distribution among creditors of the 
debtor.  
 
Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991) (quoting 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 177-78, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News 1978, pp. 6137, 6138). The Court has also stated that it 
is not our role to second guess how Congress has balanced 
these sometimes competing policies in different provisions of 
the Code. See id. at 162 (“Whether Congress has wisely 
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balanced the sometimes conflicting policies underlying § 547 
is not a question that we are authorized to decide.”).  
 
 While the Supreme Court cites to Congressional 
records to capture the essence of the provision, we find a 
more complete quote from the Committee Report to be 
helpful: 
 
A preference is a transfer that enables a creditor 
to receive payment of a greater percentage of 
his claim against the debtor than he would have 
received if the transfer had not been made and 
he had participated in the distribution of the 
assets of the bankrupt estate. The purpose of the 
preference section is two-fold. First, by 
permitting the trustee to avoid prebankruptcy 
transfers that occur within a short period before 
bankruptcy, creditors are discouraged from 
racing to the courthouse to dismember the 
debtor during his slide into bankruptcy. The 
protection thus afforded the debtor often 
enables him to work his way out of a difficult 
financial situation through cooperation with all 
of his creditors. Second, and more important, 
the preference provisions facilitate the prime 
bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution 
among creditors of the debtor. Any creditor that 
received a greater payment than others of his 
class is required to disgorge so that all may 
share equally. The operation of the preference 
section to deter ‘the race of diligence’ of 
creditors to dismember the debtor before 
bankruptcy furthers the second goal of the 
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preference section-that of equality of 
distribution.   
 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 177-78, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News 1978, pp. 6137, 6138. Notably, this explanation of the 
purpose focuses on the pre-petition period: “to deter the ‘race 
of diligence’ of creditors to dismember the debtor before 
bankruptcy furthers the . . . goal of . . . equality of 
distribution.” Id. We require those who received “a greater 
payment than others of his class to disgorge so that all may 
share equally.” Id. Thus, it makes sense that the equality 
should be measured, and inequalities rectified, as of the 
petition date.  
 
 The new value defense as part of the preference 
analysis serves two underlying purposes. As we stated in New 
York City Shoes, “First, the section is designed ‘to encourage 
trade creditors to continue dealing with troubled businesses. . 
.. Second, [it] is designed to ‘treat fairly a creditor who has 
replenished the estate after having received a preference.’” 
880 F.2d at 680-81 (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Almarc 
Mfg., 62 B.R. 684, 688 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986)). Appellant 
mischaracterizes the objective of § 547(c)(4) in stating that 
“[t]he most relevant inquiry, and policy consideration . . . is 
whether the alleged new value replenishes the estate.” 
Appellant’s Br. at 15.
7
 As Appellee points out, Appellant 
conflates the formula for calculating new value with the 
                                              
7
  Appellant relies heavily upon the Login Bros. case in 
describing the policy behind the new value defense as one of 
replenishment to the estate. 294 B.R. at 301. We are not 
bound by the Login Bros. court’s opinion, and we choose not 
to follow it for the reasons described.   
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objective of the new value defense, which is to “treat fairly a 
creditor” who provides new value. New York City Shoes, 880 
F.2d at 681.  
 
 Appellant urges that if post-petition payments by a 
debtor are not considered in the Court’s analysis of a 
creditor’s preference liability, the creditor will receive a 
“windfall” and will be unjustly favored over other creditors. 
See Appellant’s Br. at 15. Appellant argues that the debtor’s 
estate is not replenished when the debtor makes a transfer to 
the creditor after the petition date, and that the creditor 
unfairly receives double payment, once post-petition, and 
“once indirectly as an offset against its . . . preference liability 
to the estate.” Id. at 16. Appellant cites a number of cases in 
support of this proposition. See, e.g., In re T.I. Acquisition, 
LLC, 429 B.R. at 385 (“Allowing BOTH new value credit and 
payment of [a] § 503(b)(9) claim elevates the claim of that 
creditor and results in double payment to that creditor.”); 
Login Bros., 294 B.R. at 301 (“[T]he policy behind the new 
value exception—that the estate be replenished by the new 
value—would be defeated if a creditor were allowed to keep a 
preferential payment of its debt on account of a new value 
contribution to the estate and also receive repayment of that 
contribution.”); In re MMR Holding Corp., 203 B.R. at 609 
(stating that without considering post-petition transfers on 
account of new value in calculating new value offset, “the 
transferee would be receiving double use of the new value 
(once as consideration for the unavoidable transfer which 
effects a dollar-for-dollar reduction, and once as an offset to 
the prior preference which would also reflect a dollar-for-




 However, this “replenishment” argument misses the 
mark. First, it is clear that even if a creditor is paid post-
petition for new value it provided pre-petition, the creditor 
still replenished the debtor’s estate during the preference 
period, and therefore aided the debtor in avoiding bankruptcy 
to whatever extent possible. Cf. In re Commissary 
Operations, Inc., 421 B.R. at 878 (“[T]he possibility that a 
debtor may pay a creditor’s    § 503(b)(9) claim post-petition 
does not negate the value represented by the claim that the 
creditor provided to the debtor. The deliveries benefit the 
estate. . . regardless of whether the § 503(b)(9) claimants are 
paid at a later date for those deliveries.”). Second, Appellant’s 
reference to a creditor’s “double dipping” is misleading 
because it implies that the creditor is receiving payment for 
goods or services that were never provided, or that the 
creditor is being paid twice. By examining Appellant’s 
argument in the factual context of the instant case, it becomes 
clear why the argument fails. Here, the creditor provided 
services on credit during the preference period. After the 
debtor’s bankruptcy petition was filed, the trustee paid the 
creditor some of the money owed, pursuant to the Wage 
Order. All of the money the creditor received was for goods 
and services actually provided. The creditor, therefore, was 
never unjustly enriched as Appellant seems to suggest. 
 
 Appellant also urges that cutting off preference 
analysis at the petition date results in unequal treatment of 
creditors. Indeed, a number of courts have followed this line 
of reasoning in finding that post-petition events should enter 
into preference liability calculations. See, e.g., In re T.I. 
Acquisition, LLC, 429 B.R. at 385 (“The [] policy 
consideration—equal treatment of creditors—weighs heavily 
in favor of denying new value credit for allowed and paid § 
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503(b)(9) claims.”). One bankruptcy court in the District of 
New Mexico, presented with the exact question before us, 
came to this conclusion by applying different rules regarding 
the treatment of post-petition payments to a hypothetical 
preference recovery scenario and then adopting the rule that 
resulted in the most equal treatment of creditors. Furr’s 
Supermarkets, 485 B.R. at 730-31. In Furr’s Supermarkets, 
the bankruptcy court decided that treating post-petition events 
as relevant to § 574(c)(4) defenses would “result[] in 
absolutely equal treatment of all unsecured claims” and 
therefore was in accord with the policies underlying the Code. 
The court reasoned that a creditor who is repaid post-petition 
for new value should be treated identically to a creditor who 
is repaid pre-petition.  
 
 If it is a rule in bankruptcy that all creditors must be 
treated equally, surely the exceptions swallow the rule. It 
could be said that some creditors are treated more equally 
than others. There are special provisions for aircraft leases 
and shopping center leases, and some claims are given 
priority over others. The balancing of interests in, for 
instance, wage orders, has been held to justify the type of 
unequal treatment condemned in cases that would include the 
post-petition payment in the preference analysis. See, e.g., In 
re Primary Health Sys., Inc., 274 B.R. 709, 709 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2002) (holding payments pursuant to court order 
allowing debtor to pay employee wages and benefits to be out 
of reach of § 547). Inequality per se is not to be avoided; 
indeed, reasoned and justified inequality sometimes prevails, 
usually based on what is in the best interest of the estate.
8
 For 
                                              
8
 The Wage Order here specifically states that the relief 
sought is in the best interest of the Debtors and their estate.  
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this reason, the courts positing that the interpretation that 
“results in absolutely equal treatment of all unsecured claims” 
is the “most reasonable interpretation of section 547(c)(4),” 
Furr’s Supermarkets, 485 B.R. at 734, are misguided.  
 
 Moreover, we submit that the cases ruling that post-
petition payments should be counted so as to achieve 
“replenishment” and “equality” have lost sight of the real 
policy objectives as noted above. Nowhere is the goal or 
rationale of “replenishment” set forth. Nor is “equality” as 
such to be achieved. Rather, if a creditor has been preferred, 
he must “disgorge so that all may share equally.” H.R. Rep. 
No. 95-595 at 178. In other words, it is all about deterring 
“the race of diligence,” and setting things straight, before 
bankruptcy. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted:  
 
The general avoidance portion of the 
Bankruptcy Code was intended to ‘facilitate the 
prime bankruptcy policy of equality of 
distribution among creditors of the debtor.’ 
Nevertheless, the subsequent advance rule, 
section 547(c)(4), ‘was not enacted to ensure 
equitable treatment of creditors, but rather is 
intended to encourage creditors to deal with 
troubled businesses.’ 
 
In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 850 F.2d at 1280 (citations 
omitted). 
 
 In addition, we have held that the policy underlying § 
547 is that of “equal distribution among similarly situated 
creditors.” In re First Jersey Sec., Inc., 180 F.3d 504, 511 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). As we noted above, the 
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Bankruptcy Code does not give equal treatment to the claims 
of all creditors, but rather carves out special treatment for 
creditors or claims of certain kinds. For example, § 503(b)(9) 
claimants, ostensibly similar to general unsecured creditors, 
are afforded priority status for administrative expenses. 
“Critical vendors,” like Roth Staffing, can similarly be given 
preferred treatment under § 105 and § 363. A critical vendor 
who provided new value during the preference period need 
not be treated the same as another creditor who provided new 
value but is not considered by the debtor and the bankruptcy 
court to be a critical vendor post-petition. They are not 
similarly situated.  
 
 The scheme of the Bankruptcy Code contains 
numerous post-petition mechanisms for ensuring that 
similarly situated creditors are treated equally. For this 
reason, preference analysis need not account for post-petition 
activity. As the Bankruptcy Court stated, once a bankruptcy 
petition is filed, “the supervision of the case by the court, 
among other things, ensures that similar claims receive 
similar treatment.” (App. 17) The bankruptcy court acts as a 
referee, capable of considering and weighing competing 
policy objectives in authorizing, for example, the Wage Order 
in the instant case. A bankruptcy court in the Middle District 
of Tennessee has noted:  
 
Closing § 547(c)(4) analyses at the petition is 
consistent with other Code remedies that only 
apply post petition. . . . [C]onsiderations change 
when the petition is filed and the debtor 
becomes a bankruptcy estate under the 
administration of the bankruptcy court and 
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subject to the scrutiny of creditors, committees, 
the U.S. Trustee, etc. 
 
In re Phoenix Rest. Grp., Inc., 317 B.R. 491, 497-98 (Bankr. 
M.D. Tenn. 2004).
9
 Here, the Bankruptcy Court determined 
that it would be “in the best interests of the Debtors and their 
estates” to issue the Wage Order. Order Authorizing the 
Debtors and Debtors in Possession To Pay Prepetition Wages, 
Compensation and Employee Benefits Pursuant to Sections 
105(a) and 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, In re: Friedman’s 
                                              
9
  In a related case in accord with the bankruptcy court’s 
decision, the district court distinguished post-petition 
payments made under a Critical Vendor Order from post-
petition payments on a reclamation claim. In re Phoenix Rest. 
Grp., Inc., 373 B.R. 541, 547-48 (M.D. Tenn. 2007). The 
court held that reclamation claims are unique because goods 
shipped subject to reclamation “are not the same money or 
money’s worth, as goods shipped free of the seller’s strings.” 
Id. at 548 (internal quotation mark omitted). Essentially the 
court found that goods subject to reclamation do not truly 
enhance the debtor’s estate since a debtor’s conduct is limited 
by the “seller’s strings.” The court therefore concluded that a 
creditor could not assert a reclamation claim and a new value 
defense for the same money.  
 
 Here, we need not resolve the question of whether 
assertion of a reclamation claim should reduce a new value 
defense, as we are only considering the effect of payments 
made pursuant to a Wage Order (akin to a Critical Vendor 
Order). We acknowledge, however, that reclamation claims 
could be treated differently from other post-petition activities 
under the rule we are establishing the purpose of the Order. 
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Inc., No. 08-10161 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 28, 2008). If we 
allowed payments made pursuant to the Wage Order to 
increase Roth Staffing’s preference liability, we would defeat. 
In effect, we would be giving with one hand and taking away 
with the other. The intended goal of the Order – to ensure 
“continued service, satisfaction and loyalty of [the debtor’s] 
numerous Employees” – would not be served if the Debtor 
sought and obtained permission to pay wages to Appellee one 
week but then sued Appellee for a preference the next. Mot. 
of Debtors and Debtors in Possession for an Order 
Authorizing the Debtors To Pay Prepetition Wages, 
Compensation, and Employee Benefits Pursuant to Sections 
105(a) and 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code ¶ 43. We will not 
undermine the Bankruptcy Court’s Order by including such 
post-petition activity in the preference liability equation. 
Instead, we will allow the Bankruptcy Code’s provisions 
dealing with post-petition conduct to govern, as we believe 
Congress intended.  
 
C.  Kiwi Air 
 
 As a final matter we address the applicability of Kiwi 
Air, 344 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2003), to this situation. Appellant 
argues that our opinion in that case requires us to take into 
account all material post-petition events in determining 
preference liability. Kiwi Air, however, only examines the 
“unique set of rights” created by § 365 (a provision regarding 
the assumption of contracts by a trustee) and § 1110 (a 
provision on security agreements, leases, and conditional 
sales of aircraft equipment and vessels), and addresses their 
interaction with rights created under § 547. 344 F.3d at 317 
(emphasis added). In Kiwi Air, we held that the post-petition 
assumption of an executory contract under § 365 and a 
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stipulated order pursuant to § 1110, which both require a 
trustee to cure certain defaults, preclude a trustee from 
bringing a preference action to recover pre-petition payments 
made pursuant to the contract. Id. at 314. We reasoned that, 
insofar as § 365 and § 1110 entitle creditors to receive unpaid 
pre-petition payments in connection with the assumption of 
the contract and curing of defaults, allowing recovery of a 
preference payment would thwart their effect. Id. at 321. In 
particular, we emphasized that the debtor’s assumption of 
contracts was “important because it enabled [the debtor] to 
compel its creditors to continue performing under the 
assumed agreements, for the purpose of receiving contract 
benefits necessary to its operation.” Id. at 314. To the extent 
that § 365 enables bankrupt companies to continue to operate, 
it serves a similar purpose to § 363, one of the statutes upon 
which the Bankruptcy Court relied in granting Appellant’s 
Wage Order. If anything, Kiwi Air teaches that post-petition 
events can cast the payment in a different light in order to 
effectuate the purposes and provisions of the Code. Here, that 
translates into a directive that we should not undermine the 
purpose of the Wage Order. This is best accomplished by 
precluding post-petition payments made pursuant to the Wage 
Order from consideration in preference liability analysis. 
 
 Kiwi Air demonstrates that there are unique 
circumstances in which other provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code dealing with post-petition transactions directly interact 
with § 547 and thus can alter the otherwise straightforward 
preference analysis. As with the entry of the Wage Order, the 
assumption of a contract involves a “unique set of rights” that 
warrants different preference treatment of creditors not 
similarly situated. We, therefore, view the import of Kiwi Air 





 We hold that Appellant’s post-petition payment 
pursuant to the Wage Order does not affect the calculation of 
Appellee’s preference liability, pursuant to § 547. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.  
 
